The Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 and Its Spiegel Amendment: Identifying the Limits of Cease-and-Desist Authority by Guse, Kyle
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 32 | Number 3 Article 5
1-1-1992
The Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 and Its Spiegel
Amendment: Identifying the Limits of Cease-and-
Desist Authority
Kyle Guse
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Kyle Guse, Comment, The Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 and Its Spiegel Amendment: Identifying the
Limits of Cease-and-Desist Authority, 32 Santa Clara L. Rev. 911 (1992).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss3/5
COMMENTS
THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REFORM, RECOV-
ERY AND ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1989 AND ITS
SPIEGEL AMENDMENT: IDENTIFYING THE LIMITS
OF CEASE-AND-DESIST AUTHORITY
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 28, 1989, the Office of Thrift Supervision
(hereinafter OTS) began a formal investigation into the finan-
cial affairs of Columbia Savings and Loan (hereinafter Colum-
bia) and its Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, Thomas
Spiegel (hereinafter Spiegel)' to determine whether Columbia
and Spiegel violated any "financial laws, rules, or regulations."2
On July 5, 1990, Spiegel received notice from OTS stating that
OTS believed he had violated federal banking laws.' The no-
tice was accompanied with an ex parte order that required
Spiegel to turn over all of his Columbia stock and cash totaling
$18,983,000. 4 Spiegel was given twenty-four hours to comply
with the order and he was not offered an administrative hear-
ing to challenge its validity prior to the effective date of the
order.' The order directed at Spiegel is known as a
"temporary cease-and-desist (hereinafter C. & D.) order."6
1. Spiegel v. Ryan, No. CV 90-3520 SVW at 2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1990)
(LEXIS 14968, Genfed library, Dist file), rev'd, 946 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991).
2. Id.
3. 1&
4. Id. at 3. Spiegel was also given the option to post a bond or establish an
escrow account in that same amount. Id.
5. Spiegel, No. CV 90-3520 SVW at 4.
6. The temporary C. & D. statute provides:
Whenever the appropriate Federal banking agency shall determine
that the violation or threatened violation or the unsafe or unsound
practice or practices, specified in the notice of charges served upon
the depository institution or any institution- affiliated party . . . , or
the continuation thereof, is likely to cause insolvency or significant
dissipation of assets or earnings of the depository institution, or is
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The temporary C. & D. order is one of many enforcement
tools that have been revamped by the recently enacted Finan-
cial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 (hereinafter FIRREA).7 One of FIRREA's express purpos-
es8 was to strengthen the enforcement powers of financial
likely to weaken the condition of the depository institution or other-
wise prejudice the interests of its depositors prior to the completion
of the proceedings conducted pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection
(b) of this section, the agency may issue a temporary order requiring
the depository institution or such party to cease and desist from any
such violation or practice and to take affirmative action to prevent
such insolvency, dissipation, condition, or prejudice pending comple-
tion of such proceedings. Such order may include any requirement
authorized under subsection (b)(6)(B) of this section. Such order shall
become effective upon service upon the depository institution or such
institution-affiliated party and, unless set aside, limited, or suspended
by a court in proceedings authorized by paragraph (2) of this subsec-
tion, shall remain effective and enforceable pending the completion of
the administrative proceedings pursuant to such notice and until such
time as the agency shall dismiss the charges specified in such notice,
or if a cease- and-desist order is issued against the depository institu-
tion or such party, until the effective date of such order.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(cX1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1990).
7. Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (to be codified in scattered sections of 5, 7,
12, 15, 18, 26, 28, 31, 42, 40, and 44 U.S.C.). For a summary of FIRREA, see
George L. Christopher & Rebecca H. Laird, The Financial Institution Reform, Recov-
ety, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 43 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 2 (Spring 1989);
Ronald S. Holliday & Holli H. Targan, A Brave New World of Law Enforcement?,
FLA. B. J., Apr. 1990, at 50; Ronald R. Glancz, Thrift Industry Restructured: An
Overview Of FIRREA, 36 FED. B. NEWS AND J. 472 (1989); Robert A. Wittie &
Rebecca H. Laird, The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989: An Overview, 44 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 83 (Spring 1990).
8. FIRREA's purposes are:
mo provide affordable housing mortgage finance and housing oppor-
tunities for low- and moderate- income individuals through enhanced
management of federal housing credit programs and resources; estab-
lish organizations and procedures to obtain and administer the neces-
sary funding to resolve failed thrift cases and to dispose of the assets
of these institutions; establish a distinction between the regulatory and
insurance functions of the thrift industry by (1) ensuring a well capi-
talized and independent thrift insurance fund, (2) enhancing thrift
industry regulation by providing for stronger supervisory oversight of
the industry under the Department of Treasury; establish stronger
capital standards for thrifts; and, enhance the regulatory enforcement
powers of the depository institution regulatory agencies to protect
against fraud, waste and insider abuse.
H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 307-8 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 103.
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institution regulators9 as part of an overall plan to reform the
severely troubled thrift industry.
Spiegel challenged the temporary C. & D. order arguing
that it violated the fifth amendment" guarantee of due pro-
cess. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argu-
ment.2 The Ninth Circuit's decision has given the regulators
the green light to use this powerful enforcement tool. At the
same time, the court left many questions unanswered as to the
constitutional limitations on the regulator's use of the tempo-
rary C. & D. orders. Not only will the answers to these ques-
tions affect the use of future temporary C. & D. orders, they
may also have far reaching impact on other industries subject
to similar enforcement mechanisms, such as banking" and
insurance.4
The purpose of this comment is to define the constitution-
al limitations on temporary C. & D. orders that require targets
of the order to provide restitution prior to a hearing, as re-
cently expanded by FIRREA and the "Spiegel amendment" to
FIRREA.' By way of background, Part II of this comment be-
gins with a discussion of the financial institution industry and
its history of regulation. 6 The regulator's enforcement tools
are described, with particular emphasis on the temporary C. &
D. order. 7 After discussing the thrift "crisis" and the need for
closer government supervision, the expansion in temporary C.
9. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811(9) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991). See H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 439-48 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432,
478-87.
10. Far W. Fed. Bank v. OTS, 738 F. Supp. 1559, 1560 (D. Or. 1990), rev'd,
No. 90-35752, slip op. (9th Cir. 1992).
11. U.S. Const. amend. V provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The Fifth Amendment
applies because the government, acting through the OTS, deprived Spiegel of
.property" by requiring him to deposit his money into escrow. As this comment
will explore further, there is arguably a lack of "due process" in that Spiegel was
not provided with a hearing before the government "deprived" him of that prop-
erty. See infra note 151.
12. Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991).
13. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
14. Insurance industry legislation also permits regulators to summarily seize
assets, under certain circumstances, without a prior hearing. See, e.g., CAL. INS.
CODE §§ 1010-1015 (West 1991).
15. Spiegal v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991).
16. See infra notes 21-42 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 43-95 and accompanying text.
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& D. authority brought about by FIRREA and its Spiegel
amendment is examined." Finally, due process constraints in
using temporary C. & D. orders are discussed and relevant
court precedent is identified. 9
The analysis provided in Part III first focuses on the ques-
tion of whether the Ninth Circuit was correct in ruling that
temporary C. & D. orders which require a person to deposit
funds into escrow do not violate due process guarantees."
Two approaches are examined to determine whether due pro-
cess is provided in this context. First, due process is measured
against two similar enforcement tools, conservator-
ships/receiverships and officer/director suspensions. Second,
the constitutionality of the temporary C. & D. order issued
against Spiegel is discussed. After concluding that Spiegel was
correctly decided, this comment further discusses what ques-
tions the Spiegel court left unanswered. Most importantly, the
questions of what factual showing must be made by the regula-
tors to justify imposing the order, and, to what extent a review-
ing court should permit the target of the order to mount a
challenge in an injunction proceeding?
Part IV of this comment proposes answers to these ques-
tions. It is suggested that the regulators must make a specific
factual showing of the immediate need for the use of the tem-
porary C. & D. order by demonstrating a risk of dissipation of
the institution's assets. It further proposes that a reviewing
court must use a very low standard of review in examining the
regulators action, but, at the same time, the scope of review
must be sufficiently broad to provide a meaningful opportunity
for review. Therefore, it is recommended that the reviewing
court permit the party challenging the order to use evidence
outside of the agency record for the limited purpose of contra-
dicting the agencies finding of risk of dissipation of assets.
18. See infra notes 96-149 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 150-218 and accompanying text.
20. Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991). See infra notes




A. Financial Institution Regulation
1. The Financial Institution Industry
The financial institution industry, which primarily includes
savings and loan associations,' banks,n and thrifts," has a
21. According to general definitions, a "savings and loan association," also
called a "savings association" is "[olne of a number of types of mutually-owned,
cooperative, savings associations, originally established for the primary purpose of
making loans to members and others, usually for the purchase of real estate or
homes." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1205 (5th ed. 1979). More recently, savings and
loans have been granted broadened powers substantially equivalent to commercial
banks, which include, for example, expanded investment and loan powers, credit
card services and the exercise of trust powers. JOSEPH J. NORTON & SHERRI C.
WHITLEY, BANKING L. MANUAL § 1.04[3][a] (June 1991).
Statutorily, a savings association may be defined as: "(A) any federal savings
association; (B) any state savings association; and (C) any corporation . . . that the
board of Directors and the Director of [OTS] jointly determine to be operating in
substantially the same manner as a savings association." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(1).
Further, a "federal savings association" means "any Federal savings association or
Federal savings bank which is chartered under section 5 of the Home Owners'
Loan Act." Id. at (b)(2). Similarly, a "state savings association" means "any building
and loan association, savings and loan association . . . . or cooperative bank . . .
which is organized and operating according to the laws of the state." Id. at (b)(3).
22. "A bank is an institution, usually incorporated, whose business it is to re-
ceive money on deposit, cash checks or drafts, discount commercial paper, make
loans, and issue promissory notes payable to bearer, (known as bank notes)."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 131-32 (5th ed. 1979).
A statutory definition of this term is more complex; a "bank" is any of the
following-
(A) An insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act [12 U.S.C. § 1813(h)].
(B) An institution organized under the laws of the United
States, any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, any
territory of the United States . . . which both-
(i) accepts demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may
withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third parties or
others, and
(ii) is engaged in the business of making commercial loans.
12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (1988).
It appears, therefore, that an institution's identity as a bank or savings and
loan association depends on its charter, which, in turn, is dependent on its func-
tion and asset powers.
23. A "thrift" is a more general term originally used to refer to "special in-
vestment financial intermediaries for the encouragement of thrift." NORTON &
WHITLEY, supra note 21, § 1.04[3]. The term thrift, although frequently misused
by the press to refer to any financial institution, usually refers only to savings and
loan associations and savings banks. See genera//y id.; 12 U.S.C. § 1841(5) (1988).
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long history of regulation dating back to the founding of the
United States." A brief survey of this industry, and the relat-
ed major pieces of legislation, aid the reader in understanding
the need for and effect of FIRREA.
In the wake of the stock market crash of October, 1929
and the Great Depression of the 1930's, America's commercial
banking system suffered an almost complete collapse.2 ' Blame
for the collapse has been placed on numerous factors which
existed throughout the early 1900's, including fraud, misman-
agement, abuse, increased urbanization and agricultural com-
modity difficulties, incompetent or ineffective regulatory over-
sight, undercapitalization, and commercial bank participation
in investment banking activities.' The final blow to the al-
ready weak banks was widespread depositor panic, fueled by
the stock market crash, which led to bank "runs"7 and the
failure of thousands of banks.8
Again, a statutory definition of this term is somewhat more imposing. A
thrift means:
(1) any domestic building and loan or savings and loan asso-
ciation;
(2) any cooperative bank without capital stock organized and
operated for mutual purposes and without profit;
(3) any Federal savings bank; and
(4) any State-chartered savings bank the holding company of
which is registered pursuant to section 408 of the National Housing
Act, 12 U.S.C. 1730a.
Id.
Fortunately, for the purposes of this comment, the proper identification of
an institution as a savings and loan association, bank, thrift or savings bank is not
necessary; the regulators' enforcement powers generally apply in the same manner
to all of these entities.
24. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal
Response, and the Case for Presenting the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L REV.
1133, 1153 (1990).
25. Marcela Davison Avils, Expansion of Bank Powers in the Aftermath of the
Thrift Crisis: The Age of "Darwinian' Banking, 44 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 115,
118 (Spring 1990); Thad Grundy, Jr., Practical Aspects of the Deposit Isurance System,
44 Bus. LAw., 169, 169 (1988-89).
26. Avil~s, supra note 25, at 118-19.
27. A "run" occurs when depositors become concerned that their deposits
may not be safe and rush to the bank to withdraw their cash. Charles E. Schumer
& J. Brian Graham, The Unfinished Business of FIRREA, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
68, 68 (1990). Banks consequently fail because of a lack of liquidity to meet mass
withdrawals, particularly if the Federal Reserve does not step foreword quickly
enough as a lender of last resort. Interview with William K. Black, Sr. Deputy
Chief Counsel, OTS (March 11, 1992).
28. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27. See also Avil&s, supra note 25, at
FIRREA
In response to these problems, Congress passed the Glass-
Steagall Act,' commonly called the Banking Act of 1933, to
"restore depositor confidence and stimulate economic
growth."' This important piece of legislation created a wall
between commercial and investment banking; barring commer-
cial banks from purchasing, underwriting and dealing in
securities."1 The Act also established the federal deposit insur-
ance system and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(hereinafter FDIC) to administer the system. 2 The Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (hereinafter
FSLIC)"3 and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board s' were es-
tablished shortly thereafter to provide similar protection for
depositors at savings and loan associations. 5 This insurance
originally covered deposits up to $2 ,5 00,' but has been
gradually raised to a current level of $100,000.
When an insured institution failed, the FDIC or FSLIC
either subsidized the sale of the institution or liquidated it.'
When the liquidated value of the institution was insufficient to
repay the insured depositors, the insurance funds made up the
difference. 9 Congress hoped that by backing deposits with
government guarantees (in the form of depositor insurance)
disastrous bank "runs" could be avoided.4" In this respect, the
deposit insurance system has been considered quite success-
118-19.
29. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, (Banking Act), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat.
162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
30. Grundy, supra note 25, at 169.
31. Avilcs, supra note 25, at 120.
32. Grundy, supra note 25, at 169. As a regulator, the FDIC monitors compli-
ance with banking laws to ensure continued safety and soundness of financial
institutions and prosecutes civil enforcement actions "against banks or bank related
individuals whose activities pose a threat to the depositors of the bank." 1988 FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP. ANN. REP. 21 (1989) [hereinafter ANN. REP.].
33. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1730 (1988). Note that the FSLIC has recently been
abolished. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
34. I& §§ 1461-1470 (1988).
35. Grundy, supra note 25, at 169-70. The main purpose of this insurance
system was to strengthen savings and loan associations and to promote home
ownership. R. DAN BRUMBAUGH JR., THRIFTS UNDER SIEGE 9, 12 (1988).
36. ANN. REP., supra note 32, at 74.
37. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(a)(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
38. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27; at 68-69.
39. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 69.
40. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 69.
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ful.4 It has even been praised for preventing a run during the
1987 stock market crash. 2
2. Regulators and Regulations
FIRREA brought about several fundamental changes to
the regulatory structure. It abolished the FSLIC and gave the
FDIC exclusive control over deposit insurance for both banks
and thrifts." The authority to supervise savings associations
and savings and loan holding companies has been granted to
the OTS, a bureau within the Treasury Department." FIRREA
also created the Resolution Trust Corporation for the purpose
of dealing with the savings and loan crisis by merging or liqui-
dating the thrifts placed into conservatorship or receiver-
ship." Other federal regulators, identified by statute as the
"appropriate Federal banking agency," include the Comptroller
of the Currency and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.46
These agencies regulate our country's financial institutions
through the use of statutes,47 administrative regulations, rul-
ings, and interpretive releases.48 The broader objectives of
41. Avil~s, supra note 25, at 120 (furthermore, deposit insurance "has been
cited as the structural change most conducive to monetary stability since the Civil
War"); Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 69.
42. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 69.
43. Glancz, supra note 7, at 474. The insurance funds of thrifts will remain
separate, however, from the insurance funds of banks (bank insurance funds are
kept in the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) and thrift insurance funds are kept in the
Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF)). Glancz, supra note 7, at 474.
44. Glancz, supra note 7, at 474; 12 U.S.C.A. § 181 3(q)( 4) (West 1989 &
Supp. 1991).
45. Glancz, supra note 7, at 474.
46. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(q) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991). The term "appropriate
Federal banking agency" is used to identify the federal regulator responsible for
each type of financial institution. Id. The Comptroller of the Currency is assigned
to national banking associations, and district banks (District of Columbia and the
Virgin Islands). Id. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is as-
signed to state member insured banks, branches or agencies of foreign banks,
foreign banks without an insured branch, agencies and commercial lending compa-
nies, and bank holding companies. Id.
47. Statutes are found primarily throughout Title 12 of the United States
Code.
48. See 12 CFR (Comptroller of the Currency, parts 1-199; Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, parts 200-299; FDIC, parts 300-499; OTS,
parts 500-599). For the purpose of this comment, the term "regulation" will gener-
ally refer to the constraints imposed by statutes.
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these regulations range from promoting the role of the bank-
ing system as facilitator of monetary policy to supporting the
banking system as the primary payment mechanism within our
economy.49 More specific objectives of regulations are aimed
at ensuring the overall safety and soundness of financial insti-
tutions.' Regulations with these latter objectives may be clas-
sified as either structural, protective or preventive." Several
examples of the these regulations will provide an insight into
the regulatory scheme and demonstrate the need for effective
enforcement tools.
Structural regulations include requirements on entry and
geographical limits.5 2 For example, since the Glass-Steagall
Act, commercial banks have been barred from doing business
in the securities industry. These banks are also generally
prohibited from sharing any officer, director, or employee with
an organization that sells securities." Common protective reg-
ulations include deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort sup-
port.5
Preventive regulations are designed to curb risk-taking and
reduce the likelihood of insolvency.' Examples include mini-
mum capital standards," which require financial institutions
to maintain specific minimum levels of private capital, such as
shareholders equity or preferred stock." Capital standards are
intended to ensure that private capital is at risk in any invest-
ment decision made by the insured institution. Other areas
of regulatory oversight include investment and lending restric-
49. NORTON & WHITLEY, supra note 21, § 1.03.
50. Id.
51. Id. See aso Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failues Risk
Monitoring. and the Market for Bank Control, COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (1988).
52. NORTON & WHITLEY, supra note 21, § 1.03.
53. Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 1139, 1162; supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
54. Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 1162.
55. NORTON & WHITLEY, supra note 21, § 1.03.
56. Id.
57. 12 U.S.C.A. § 146(t), § 1464(s) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991). See Schumer
& Graham, supra note 27, at 70.
58. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 80 n.13. Savings associations must
satisfy three minimum capital tests: (1) a leverage ratio, (2) tangible capital, and
(3) a risk based test. 12 U.S.C.A. § 146(t)(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
59. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 80 n.13.
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tions, ° accounting standards,6' controls on interest rates paid
on deposits and limitations on holding company activities.62
With this brief history of the financial institution industry
and its attendant regulations,"' we now turn to the problem
of enforcement. Enforcement problems, which are exacerbated
by the fact that financial institution assets are highly liquid and
therefore highly susceptible to theft, are attacked with a num-
ber of unique enforcement tools.
B. The Regulatory Enforcement Tools
The regulatory agencies have authority to use a wide
range of weapons that may target not only the institutions but
also the people who run them.' Enforcement mechanisms
include civil money penalties,65 officer/director removals and
suspensions," conservatorship and receivership,67  termina-
60. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(b) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
61. Id. § 1467.
62. Id. § 1467(a). See Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 70; Wilmarth,
supra note 24, at 1139-40. Note that in the 1980's controls on interest rates paid
on deposits were largely eliminated. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
63. This partial list of statutes is very brief because a more detailed explana-
tion is not necessary for the purposes of this comment. The statutes and regu-
lations are very complex and span thousands of pages of Title 12 of the United
States Code and Code of Federal Regulations.
64. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
65. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(i) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991). Civil money penalties
may be assessed against any institution or institution-affiliated party who violates
any law, regulation, final or temporary order, or written agreement between the
institution and the agency. Id. The penalty may range from less than $25,000 per
day to not greater than $1,000,000 and the party is entitled to notice and a hear-
ing. Id. The imposition and amount of the penalty are largely within the discre-
tion of the agency. Stephen K. Huber, Enforcement Powers of Federal Banking Agen-
des, 7 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 123, 142 (1988).
66. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(e) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991). Administrative proceed-
ings may be initiated to remove an institution-affiliated party whenever the appro-
priate federal banking agency determines that such party has violated any law or
cease-and-desist order, or engaged in any unsafe or unsound practice, or breached
his or her fiduciary duty, and the depository institution has or will suffer a loss
or such party has received financial gain or benefit. Id. The institution- affiliated
party may then be suspended after, or contemporaneous with, service of notice
and after the agency determines that such action is necessary for the protection
of the depository institution or the interests of the depositors. Id.
67. Conservatorship and receivership actions "are more drastic, they are gen-
erally used as a last resort, primarily in cases of insolvency." ALPHRED M.
POLLARD ET AL., BANKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, § 5.5, at 17 (1988 &
Supp. 1990) "A conservator takes charge of an institution and operates it in such
a manner so as to conserve its assets pending further regulatory action . . . ." Id.
1992] FIRREA
tion of deposit insurance," capital directives,69 informal en-
forcement mechanisms and other enforcement schemes."0
This comment focuses on the temporary C. & D. order, a com-
mon enforcement tool."
The authority to issue the temporary C. & D. order was
granted by the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966
(hereinafter FISA).72 FISA authorized regulators to issue tem-
porary C. & D. orders in advance of an administrative hear-
ing." The Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate
Control Act of 1978 (hereinafter FIRA)'* strengthened en-
forcement powers by extending the application of a temporary
C. & D. order to individuals and by enhancing removal pow-
ers." The powers originally authorized under FISA, and ex-
panded by FIRA, continued to constitute the primary enforce-
ment tools available to the federal regulatory agencies. '6
C. & D. orders have been considered the administrative
equivalent of an injunction,77 intended as a mechanism to per-
mit regulators to quickly and effectively "require adherence to
the law and cessation of unsafe and unsound practices. "78
68. Title 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991) (authorizes the
FDIC to suspend and terminate an institution's deposit insurance).
69. The federal banking agencies are authorized to regulate capitalization and
may issue capital orders requiring "particular banks to raise additional capital, on
the theory that operating with inadequate capitalization constitute[s] an unsafe and
unsound banking practice." Huber, supra note 65, at 147. The authority to issue a
capital directive falls within the discretion of the regulators as a matter of law and
such directives are not subject to court review. BNA's BANKING REPORT, Vol. 56
at 978 (May 20, 1990) (citing FDIC v. Bank of Coushatta, CA 5, No. 90-4577).
70. POLLARD, supra note 67, at 57-104.
71. The FDIC listed 267 cease-and-desist orders outstanding at the end of
1988. ANN. REP., supra note 32, at 21.
72. Pub. L. 89695, Title II, 80 Stat. 1028 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1818 (1988)).
73. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c) (1988).
74. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of
5, 12, 15, 18, 31 and 42 U.S.C. (1988)).
75. Huber, supra note 65, at 141.
76. Id.
77. Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itsey: Revising and Reshap-
ing the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1117, 1120
(1989).
78. POLLARD, supra note 67, at 58.
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There are two types of C. & D. orders: "temporary"" and
"permanent."
'
1. Permanent Cease-and-Desist Orders
A permanent C. & D. order may be obtained when, inter
alia, the appropriate federal banking agency has reasonable
cause to believe that the depository institution or
institution-affiliated party is about to violate, or has violated, a
law or is about to engage in, or has engaged in, an unsafe or
unsound practice." The institution or institution-affiliated par-
ty is entitled to notice and a hearing prior to issuance and
enforcement of the order."
As an example of the use of the C. & D. order, consider
dej unco v. Conover." In del junco, the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency found that certain directors of a bank had
violated the legal lending limits applicable to national banks.'
The regulators issued a permanent C. & D. order which re-
quired the bank's directors to indemnify the bank for any loss-
es sustained as a result of the lending violations.' The court
concluded that the order was supported by substantial evi-
dence and upheld the order upon a finding that such use of
the order was within the discretion of the regulator."
79. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1) (1988). See text supra note 6.
80. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1988).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 682 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983). As an-
other example of the permanent cease-and-desist order see Hoffman v. FDIC, 912
F.2d 1172, 1173 (9th Cir. 1990) (upheld regulators' use of a permanent
cease-and-desist order which required the president of a bank to repay the amount
he received to buy-out his employment contract immediately before the bank
closed).
84. delJunco, 682 F.2d at 1340. The directors were accused of violating provi-
sions of 12 U.S.C. § 84, which "limits the amount that a bank can lend to a sin-
gle borrower to 10% of the bank's capital stock." delJunco, 682 F.2d at 1339.
85. Id. at 1339-40.
86. Id. at 13414. The court stated that the Comptroller of the Currency "has
broad discretion to cure the effect of a violation" and that once he concludes
there is a violation, he/she may "fashion relief in such a form as to prevent fu-
ture abuses." Id. at 1340 (quoting Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of Currency,
573 F.2d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1978)). The court reasoned that the order "serves to
protect the bank's assets . . . insure[s] that the Directors fulfill their fiduciary
duty, and . . . prevent[s] the Directors from insuring themselves against liability
for their wrongful act at the Bank's expense." Id. at 1343.
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The permanent C. & D. order has a major drawback; the
target of the order is entitled to a pre-enforcement administra-
tive hearing, which can be quite time consuming." The insti-
tution may be further damaged during the time between the
notice of charges and the completion of the hearing.' To
help deal with this "delay problem", the "temporary" C. & D.
was. devised.
2. Temporary Cease-and-Desist Orders
The temporary order is unique in that it becomes effective
at the time it is served upon the institution or institution- affili-
ated party. The target of the order is directed to comply with
its provisions prior to an opportunity for an administrative
hearing. 9 If the recipient chooses not to comply with the
order's mandates the regulators must apply to the District
Court for an injunction to enforce the order.' Enforcement
is thus made compulsory via the courts contempt powers. At
the same time, a party that chooses not to comply with the
order may immediately challenge the order by applying to the
district court for an injunction to set aside the order.'
There are several reasons for the urgency in obtaining an
immediate C. & D. order, reasons which stem from the unique
nature of financial institutions. First and foremost, immediate
availability of the temporary C. & D. order promotes the
strong interest in maintaining "public confidence in our bank-
ing institutions. " ' Loss of "public confidence," resulting in a
bank run, 3 can occur when regulators are not permitted to
87. Huber, supra note 65, at 134.
88. See Huber, supra note 65, at 133.
89. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(c)(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991). See supm text accom-
panying note 6.
90. 12 U.S.C § 1818(d) (1988).
91.
Within 10 days after the depository institution concerned or any
institution-affiliated party has been served with a temporary
cease-and-desist order, the depository institution or such party may
apply to the United States district court .. . for an injunction setting
aside, limiting, or suspending the enforcement, operation, or effec-
tiveness of such order pending completion of the administrative pro-
ceedings ....
Id. at § 18 18(cX2).
92. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 241 (1988).
93. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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move swiftly when customer deposits are at risk. Public confi-
dence is further undermined when these deposits are not in-
sured. Secondly, financial institution assets by their very nature
are highly liquid (for example, cash and securities) and are,
therefore, very susceptible to dissipation by corrupt insiders.
The temporary C. & D. order, since it may be employed imme-
diately, helps prevent further dissipation of assets in the event
of a lengthy hearing.' Finally, by using the temporary C. & D.
order to immediately secure assets that have been dissipated
from the institution, use of the order could potentially save the
financial institution from failure.95
With this background of the C. & D. order this discussion
shifts to the thrift crisis and the need which the crisis created
for increased supervision over financial institutions. This need
was satisfied, in part, by FIRREA's enhancement of the tempo-
rary C. & D. provisions.
C. The Thrift Industry Crisis
1. Scope of the Thrift Crisis
Prior to enactment of FIRREA, the "thrift crisis" had
reached epic proportions. At year-end 1988, there was a total
of 2,949 FSLIC insured savings and loans, of which 364 were
insolvent and 390 were "troubled."' Insolvent thrifts lost
$14.8 billion in 1988 and ended 1988 with a net worth of nega-
tive $11.6 billion. 7 Only fifty-six percent of troubled thrifts,
with assets of $314 billion, posted a profit in 1988." These
losses pushed the FSLIC into insolvency.
The deposit insurance system was designed to be self-
supporting in "normal" economic times, funded by premiums
94. See generally Huber, supra note 65, at 133.
95. Interview with William K. Black, Sr. Deputy Chief Counsel, OTS (March
11, 1992).
96. H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 303 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 99. For statistical purposes, a thrift is classified as insolvent
when its Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) capital-to-asset ratio is
less than zero. A thrift is classified as "troubled" when its capital ratio is between
zero and three percent. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 302 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 98.
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imposed on banks and thrifts."° During the thrift crisis of the
late 1980's, however, the cost of liquidating or selling the many
failed thrifts depleted the funds of the FSLIC leaving the tax-
payers to finance a bailout... with an estimated cost of at
least $335 billion."°
The banking industry experienced fewer problems than
the thrift industry, but still reported a record setting rate of
failures. Of the 13,114 FDIC insured commercial banks, 1,823
reported losses in 1988,10 200 insured banks failed and
twenty-two received FDIC assistance."° This is a sharp in-
crease in failures compared to the 149 banks that failed for the
entire twenty year period from 1960 to 1980. Further, the
FDIC incurred its first net loss in 1988 of $4.2 billion. 5
These losses in the banking industry are attributed to the ad-
verse effect the energy and agricultural industries had on real
estate and on the poor debt service record of some lesser de-
veloped nations."°
The first step in solving the thrift crisis was to identify the
causes. As shown below, the causes are multifarious and pre-
FIRREA solutions were anything but effective.
2. Causes of the Thrift Crisis
Numerous factors have been cited as contributing to the
thrift crisis, including poor management, inadequate regulato-
ry oversight, and regional economic collapse.' The root of
the crisis, however, may be found in the basic thrift operating
structure and the changes in that structure effectuated by the
Reagan-era policy of deregulation.
100. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 69.
101. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 69.
102. H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 515 (1989), mprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 309. Note that this figure is not discounted to present
value and the total cost of the bailout will vary depending on the extent of fi-
nancing provided by long-term borrowing. Interview with William K. Black, Sr.
Deputy Chief Counsel, OTS (March 11, 1992).
103. ANN. REP., supra note 32, at 55.
104. ANN. REP., supra note 32, at 57.
105. ANN. REP., supra note 32, at 57.
106. ANN. REP., supra note 32, at 55.
107. H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 294 (1989), reptinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 90.
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Thrifts began to experience profitability problems in the
1970's when depositors were lured to banking institutions and
other non-thrift institutions offering more attractive invest-
ments.'" To restore competitiveness and profitability, Con-
gress deregulated the liability side of the thrift balance sheet
by removing the cap on interest rates that could be offered on
deposits.'" This did not, however, solve the problem because
the cost of those deposits, that is the interest that must be paid
to depositors, was correspondingly much higher."' Further-
more, at the time there was not a corresponding deregulation
of the asset side of the balance sheet; thrifts were locked into
long-term fixed-rate investments."' Since interest rates were
rising dramatically during this period, thrift liabilities repriced
at increasing rates and thrift fixed-rate assets did not produce
enough income to pay for increasingly expensive deposits."
Consequently, thrifts lost capital and posted huge losses."'
108. See Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 1143. Two factors have been cited for the
decreased economic viability of the banking system: (1) the development of low
cost information technology which enables non-bank businesses to compete with
banks in providing financial services, and (2) high and volatile interest rates which
force banks to pay market rates on deposits in order to avoid losing funds to
nonbank competitors. Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 114142.
109. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980). See also Avil6s, supra note 23, at 115;
Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 1143; Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 69.
The need for interest rate deregulation also stemmed from the fundamental
manner in which thrifts operated. When interest rates rise and other investments
become more attractive to depositors, thrifts must match the rate increase with
the rate of return offered on the thrift's deposits in order to retain and attract
depositors. The rate of return offered on deposits could not, however, be raised
sufficiently to attract deposits because such rates were regulated. As a conse-
quence, thrifts faced decreased profitability or losses when interest rates rose. See
generally Schumer & Graham, supra note 25, at 69. In response, Congress deregu-
lated the interest rate that banks and thrifts could offer on their deposits.
110. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 69.
111. Avilds, supra note 25, at 116.
112. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 69. See also Avil~s, supra note 25,
116. Thrifts took in deposits and invested those funds in fixed-rate home mort-
gages with maturity dates as distant as thirty years. Schumer & Graham, supra
note 27, at 69.
113. See Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 69; Avils, supra note 25, at
116. To compound the problem, instead of closing down the thrifts that became
insolvent, the government further deregulated thrifts by granting forbearance from
capital requirements. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 70. Insolvent and
inadequately capitalized thrifts were permitted to grow as much as 500 percent
per year during the early 1980's. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 70.
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In an effort to rebuild the capital base of thrifts, assets
were deregulated, giving thrifts broader investment powers."4
Thrifts were permitted to invest in higher-risk assets, such as
commercial loans, real estate developments, futures, and op-
tions.115 This plan backfired for a number of reasons, includ-
ing the massive collapse of regional real estate values, which
caused further devaluation of thrift assets."6 Further, in-
creased investment powers expanded the opportunities for
thrift operators to enrich themselves at the expense of the in-
stitutions and the insurance funds."7 At the same time, these
new asset choices produced "massive phony reporting of prof-
its and capital.""'
The thrift regulatory structure was incapable of handling
these massive changes in the thrift industry."9 This industry
transformation, particularly the increased investment powers
and potentials for insider abuse, coupled with an inadequate
regulatory structure, created a corresponding need for closer
regulatory oversight."
3. The Need for Closer Supervision
One of the lessons to be learned from the thrift crisis is
the need for increased supervision and oversight of financial
institution activities.' Strict governmental supervision was re-
quired to ensure that desperate thrifts did not abuse their new
powers and make foolish investments, driving the thrifts fur-
ther into insolvency." Congress also recognized the need to
114. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320,
§§ 101-41, 96 Stat. 1469. See also Avil~s, supra note 25, at 116; Schumer & Gra-
ham, supra note 27, at 70.
115. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 70; Avilis, supra note 25, at
116-17.
116. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 69. The cause of the decrease in
real estate values may ultimately be traced to the thrifts themselves; thrifts funded
office construction in already overbuilt markets causing rents and market values to
decrease. Interview with William K. Black, Sr. Deputy Chief Counsel, OTS (March
11, 1992).
117. See Avil~s, supra note 25, at 116.
118. Interview with William K. Black, Sr. Deputy Chief Counsel, OTS (March
11, 1992).
119. Avil~s, supra note 25, at 116.
120. See Avils, supra note 25, at 116-17.
121. See generally Avil6s, supra note 25, at 117.
122. See Avil~s, supra note 25, at 117; Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at
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"further fine tune supervisory provisions in order to address
potential problems that might arise as a result of the granting
of expanded powers."12
Further adding to the need for closer supervision and
enforcement of thrift activities is the concept of "moral haz-
ard." 124 Deposit insurance decreases the incentive that in-
sured depositors have to control excessive risk taking because
their insured funds are protected, regardless of the outcome of
an investment strategy.2 - The risk of "moral hazard" in-
creased during the thrift crisis because financial institutions
"on the brink of insolvency [had] an incentive to take impru-
dent risks in an attempt to regain solvency." 6 In a sense,
when a financial institution is about to collapse, insiders are
tempted to speculate with the government's money in a last
ditch attempt to save the institution. 127 This incentive to gam-
ble with the government's money increases the risk of asset
dissipation in the period immediately before insolvency. Risk
of dissipation frequently persists even after insolvency because
failing thrifts sometimes do not accurately report their finan-
cial condition.'28 Consequently, there is an increased need for
supervision and regulatory oversight. Most importantly, gov-
ernment supervision and intervention are necessary before any
significant dissipation of assets can occur.
Before enhanced enforcement powers arrived thrifts piled
up billions more in losses.' It was against this background
that FIRREA was enacted, bringing with it enhanced regulatory
70.
123. H.R. REP. No. 5094, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 139 (1988).
124. The term "moral hazard" refers to the problem that an insured person
has less of an incentive to reduce risk than an uninsured person merely because
that person is insured. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 150
(3d ed. 1986).
125. Macey & Miller, supra note 51, at 1165.
126. Macey & Miller, supra note 51, at 1200.
127. Macey & Miller, supra note 51, at 1200.
128. Interview with William K. Black, Sr. Deputy Chief Counsel, OTS (March
11, 1992).
129. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 70. It is not clear, however, the
extent to which enhanced enforcement powers by themselves would have reduced
thrift losses. Enhanced powers by themselves would not have provided a cure-all
to the problems. Political will and adequate resources would also have been neces-
sary to put any enhanced powers to use. Interestingly, President Reagan actually
cut the resources of the regulatory agencies by 65 percent from 1984 to 1987.
Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 70.
[Vol. 32
1992] FIRREA 929
tools to ensure that savings and loans would not be pushed
further into insolvency.13
D. FIRREA Expanded Enforcement Powers
1. Broad Changes in Authority
FIRREA is a vast 1"' piece of legislation that may have the
most dramatic effect on financial institutions since 1933.132
This comment, however, will be limited in scope to the expan-
sion of the temporary C. & D. authority.
ss
FIRREA expanded, enhanced and clarified"s the enforce-
ment powers of the regulatory agencies in several significant
respects. Two important definitional changes were enacted.
First, FIRREA enhanced enforcement capabilities by expanding
enforcement targets to include those deemed an
"institution-affiliated party." "Institution-affiliated party" is a
very broad term, which includes directors, officers, agents,
employees, consultants, joint venture partners and other per-
sons who participate in the affairs of the institution."5 Fur-
130. Schumer & Graham, supra note 27, at 70.
131. FIRREA is 400 to 1,500 pages long, depending on the printed version,
and includes amendments to 44 existing congressional acts. Glancz, supra note 7,
at 473-74.
132. FIRREA has been called "perhaps the most dramatic change in financial
institution structure since 1933, affecting not only savings and loans, but the fun-
damental provision of financial services, capital standards and enforcement and
supervisory authority of the regulatory agencies." POLLARD, supra note 65, at vii.
133. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(c)(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
134. H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 311 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 107.
135. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(u) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991). An "institution-affiliated
party" includes:
(1) any director, officer, employee, or controlling stockholder
(other than a bank holding company) of, or agent for, an insured
depository institution;
(2) any person who has filed or is required to file a
change-in-control notice with the appropriate Federal banking agency
under section 18170) of this title;
(3) any shareholder (other than a bank holding company), con-
sultant, joint venture partner, and any other person as determined by
the appropriate Federal banking agency (by regulation or case-by-case)
who participates in the conduct of the affairs of an insured deposito-
ry institution; and
(4) any independent contractor (including any attorney, apprais-
er, or accountant) who knowingly or recklessly participates in-
(A) any violation of any law or regulation;
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ther, FIRREA extended agency enforcement powers to
institution- affiliated parties who have resigned or been termi-
nated.'" Regulators may now pursue enforcement actions for
up to six years after an officer or director resigns or is termi-
nated."7 Congress enacted this provision in response to
Stoddard v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System""5
which held that a bank officer was no longer subject to en-
forcement actions because he had resigned from the institu-
tion."' With this provision Congress was apparently trying to
prevent people from thwarting enforcement action simply by
resigning from their positions. These aspects of expansion are
important because there will now be a greater number of peo-
ple and entities susceptible to the temporary C. & D. order
and its post deprivation hearing procedures; people and enti-
ties whose connection with a financial institution may be some-
what attenuated.
Second, FIRREA expands the scope of enforcement provi-
sions by amending the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. The
term "bank" has been replaced with the term "Depository Insti-
tution."140 This change makes enforcement provisions appli-




(B) any breach of fiduciary duty; or
(C) any unsafe or unsound practice, which caused or is likely
to cause more than a minimal financial loss to, or a significant ad-
verse effect on, the insured depository institution.
Id.
Prior to FIRREA, potential targets included only banks, bank holding com-
panies and their officers, directors, employees, agents and any other persons par-
ticipating in the affairs of an insured bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (1988). See Stuart M.
Bloch & Wesley Williams, Sr., Enforcement Provisions of FIRREA, 36 FED. B. NEWS
AND J. 481 (Dec. 1989).
136. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(iX3) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
137. Id.
138. 868 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1989); cf Araya v. Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (hereinafter FHLBB), 839 F.2d 1349, 1350 (9th Cir. 1988) holding that the
FHLBB may institute enforcement actions against a former officer of an Savings
and Loan Association so long as that officer's alleged misconduct occurred while
he was in office.
139. Holliday & Targan, supra note 7, at 51.
140. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
141. Id.; Bloch & Williams, supra note 130, at 481.
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2. Scope of Cease-and-Desist Orders Expanded
FIRREA substantially expanded the temporary C. & D.
provisions in two respects. First, the Act lessened the
government's burden of proof4 2 needed to sustain a tempo-
rary C. & D. order. Prior to FIRREA, the temporary C. & D.
order was available only when the appropriate agency deter-
mined that the violations or threatened violations were likely
to cause "substantial" dissipation of assets or earnings, or "seri-
ously" weaken the condition of the bank or "seriously" preju-
dice the interests of its depositors.4 Under FIRREA, the vio-
lation or threatened violation need only be likely to cause "sig-
nificant" (as opposed to "substantial") dissipation of assets or
earnings. Further, the regulatory agency is no longer required
to find a potential for "serious" weakening of the bank's condi-
tion or a potential for "seriously" prejudicing the interests of
the depositors.'44 FIRREA has entirely deleted these terms.
As a result of this easing of the government's burden of
proof,' the temporary C. & D. order may now be more
readily obtained. Thus, the temporary C. & D. order may be
used more frequently and a wider range of potential targets
142. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 439 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432, 478.
143. Prior to FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1) provided:
Whenever the appropriate Federal banking agency shall determine
that the violation or threatened violation or the unsafe or unsound
practices . . . is likely to cause insolvency or substantial dissipation of
assets or earnings of the bank, or is likely to seriously weaken the
condition of the bank or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of
its depositors prior to the completion of the proceedings . . . the
agency may issue a temporary order.
12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
144. Under FIRREA, the cease and desist section now provides:
Whenever the appropriate Federal banking agency shall determine
that the violation or threatened violation or the unsafe or unsound
practice . . . is likely to cause insolvency or significant dissipation of
assets or earnings of the depository institution, or is likely to weaken
the condition of the depository institution or otherwise prejudice the
interests of its depositors prior to the completion of the proceedings.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(c)(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
145. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 439 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 328, 478. This states that "the Conferees intend (1) that the
term 'significant' lower the agencies' burden of proof from the term 'substantial';
and (2) that 'significant' cover anything more than a minimal or nominal dissipa-
tion of assets." Id.
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now exist which may not have met the pre-FIRREA burden of
proof.
Second, FIRREA clarified the regulator's temporary C. &
D. power by specifically enumerating broad situations in which
it may currently be employed, for example requiring the target
of the order to take affirmative action to guarantee against
loss, or provide reimbursement, indemnification or restitu-
tion.' Prior to FIRREA, there was a split in authority as to
whether restitution was statutorily authorized by the temporary
C. & D. statute.'47 This aspect of expansion is important be-
cause the regulatory agencies apparently now have the authori-
ty to issue a temporary C. & D. order that requires the taking
of affirmative action to provide reimbursement.4 '
Presently, regulators are statutorily authorized to require
the target of the order to provide "reimbursement" by depos-
iting funds (which they are suspected of misappropriating) into
an escrow account, and, most importantly, the party is directed
to comply with the order prior to a hearing. This form of a
temporary C. & D. order is quite intrusive in that the recipient
of the order is not merely required to "cease" from engaging
146. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(b)(6) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
The authority to issue an order . . .which requires an insured depos-
itory institution or any institution-affiliated party to take affirmative
action to correct or remedy any conditions resulting from any viola-
tion or practice with respect to which such order is issued includes
the authority to require such depository institution or such party to-
(A) make restitution or provide reimbursement, indemnification,
or guarantee against loss if-
(i) such depository institution or such party was unjustly en-
riched in connection with such violation or practice; or
(ii) the violation or practice involved a reckless disregard for
the law or any applicable regulations or prior order of the appropri-
ate Federal banking agency;
(B) restrict the growth of the institution ....
Prior to FIRREA, regulatory agencies had the authority to "take
affirmative action to correct the conditions resulting from any such
violation or practice." 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1988).
147. See, for example, Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244
(7th Cir. 1986), where the court struck down an order by the regulators which re-
quired the bank directors to reimburse their bank for losses resulting from the
bank director's violations of law. Larmimore, 789 F.2d at 1256. Larimore has thus
been overruled by FIRREA and cease-and-desist orders may now require restitution
from individuals. H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., Ist Ses., pt. I, at 468 (1989), M-
printed in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 264.
148. See Holliday & Targan, supra note 7, at 51.
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in a particular activity, recipients must take affirmative action
by depositing funds into the escrow account."9
It is this "escrow temporary C. & D. order" that is the
focus of the remainder of this comment. Specifically, this com-
ment addresses the due process issue which is directly raised
by FIRREA's enhanced enforcement provisions and the
pre-hearing feature of the temporary C. & D. order.
E. Due Process Requirements in General
This section surveys due process requirements as they
relate to the government's use of the pre-hearing "escrow tem-
porary C. & D. order." It outlines basic due process concepts
and analogizes them to similar situations.
1. Basic Concepts
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.""5 Use of regulatory en-
forcement tools, for example, C. & D. orders, civil money pen-
alties, removals, and receiverships, undeniably deprive that
person of property.' Due process therefore applies and
"[o]nce it is determined that due process applies, the question
remains what process is due.""2
In most situations due process demands that a hearing be
held before any significant deprivation occurs, yet the Court
has recognized that there are certain "extraordinary situations"
149. The target may, however, challenge the order by applying to the district
court for an injunction. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(d) (1988).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See supra note 11.
151. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972) ("Any significant taking of
property ... is within the purview of the Due Process Clause."); FDIC v. Mallen,
486 U.S. 230, 240 (1988) ("It is undisputed that . . . the right to continue to
serve as president of the bank and to participate in the conduct of its affairs is a
property right protected by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause."). Regard-
ing deprivation in the temporary C. & D. order context, the Spiegel court avoided
having to decide whether such orders result in a deprivation of property. Spiegel
v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1991). Rather, the Spiegel court assumed a
deprivation occurred before concluding that there was not a lack of due process.
Id. likewise, this author will assume that the temporary C. & D. order results in a
deprivation.
152. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (emphasis added) (holding
that due process did entitle a parolee to a hearing prior to revocation of his pa-
role).
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that justify postponing a hearing until after the deprivation."
Examples include summary seizure of property to satisfy tax
liens, meeting the needs of a national war effort, protecting
against economic disaster of bank failure and protecting the
public from misbranded drugs and foods." FIRREA, because
it authorizes issuance of temporary C. & D. orders before a
hearing can be held, directly raises the due process issue of
whether this is an "extraordinary situation" which would justify
hearing postponement.
The banking agencies are beginning to use their expanded
enforcement power to require institution-affiliated parties to
deposit funds into escrow in order to secure the assets. The
U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutionality of
these actions. There are also very few lower court cases dealing
with due process in this context; most cases concern the juris-
dictional limits imposed on court review of permanent C. & D.
orders.5  Other cases also focusing on non-due process as-
pects of the temporary C. & D. provisions range from issues
concerning the regulator's discretion in fashioning and issuing
the temporary order' to the time limits in which a challenge
to a temporary order must be brought. 7
153. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 67 (1972).
154. Id. at 92-93.
155. Judicial review of permanent cease-and-desist orders is granted exclusively
to the United States circuit courts of appeal. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1) (1988). See,
e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Scotia v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 162, 167 (D.D.C.
1982) (district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over disputes arising
from agency action initiated under permanent cease-and-desist provision); Groos
Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1978)
(section 1818 removes district court jurisdiction to issue injunctions or declaratory
judgments affecting regulatory agency's notice or order); Investment Co. Inst. v.
FDIC, 728 F.2d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 1984) (order compelling the FDIC to enjoin a
third party's allegedly illegal conduct exceeded the district court's power and au-
thority under section 1818).
156. See infra notes 203-08.
157. Section 1818(c)(2) requires that challenges to temporary cease-and-desist
orders be made within ten days from issuance. See Anonymous Banks v. FDIC,
645 F. Supp. 706, 707-08 (D. Mont. 1986) (ten day period of limitations pre-
scribed by section 1818(c)(2) includes legal holidays, Saturdays and Sundays). Oth-
er cases discussing the temporary cease-and-desist order, but which do not address
the due process issue, include In re Firstcorp v. OTS, 122 B.R. 484, 490 (E.D.N.C.
1990) (temporary cease-and- desist order which requires the transfer of assets of a
chapter 11 savings and loan holding company are stayed under the bankruptcy
code and the OTS cannot enforce the temporary order against the savings and
loan, its officers, or its employees); Mid America Bancorporation v. Board of Gov-
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One case which does address due process requirements in
the temporary C. & D. order context is Parker v. Ryan. 5 In
Parker, the OTS issued a temporary C. & D. order which re-
quired, among other things,59 the target of the order to post
"security" of approximately $13 million." The Parker court
held that the temporary C. & D. order with its post-deprivation
hearing procedures did provide due process."'1
ernors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 523 F. Supp. 568, 578 (D. Minn. 1980) (denied
motion to enjoin temporary cease-and-desist order which prevented liquidation of
a bank because potential harm to the bank caused by the order was not out-
weighed by the Board's interest in regulating the banking industry); Tucker Coun-
ty Bank v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 83-3593 (D.D.C. Dec.
21, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (denied motion for preliminary
injunction to set aside a temporary cease-and-desist order which required the bank
to reissue and publish a report).
158. Parker v. Ryan, No. 90-W186-B-0 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 2, 1991) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Courts file). The target of the order was Tommy M, Parker, for-
mer director, officer, loan committee member and shareholder of Mississippi Sav-
ings Bank of Batesville, Mississippi. Id. at 1.
[Parker was charged with] unsound banking practices in conducting
the business of [the bank]; with engaging in acts or omissions which
constitute breaches of fiduciary duties; violations of laws and regula-
tions thereby causing financial losses to (the bank] and prejudicing
the interest of [the bank] and its depositors . . . ; improper personal
financial gain or other personal benefits by reason of such violations,
practices and breaches of fiduciary duties.
Id. at 9.
159. The order also required Parker to:
(1) [P]rovide to OTS a sworn statement identifying all accounts or
other assets; (2) to provide to OTS a financial statement prepared by
a certified public accountant identifying all of his assets and liabili-
ties . . . ; (3) to cease and to refrain from transferring any funds or
assets other than those necessary to pay ordinary and reasonable liv-
ing expenses; (4) to provide OTS with federal and state tax forms for
1988 and 1989; (5) to cease and to refrain from selling, transferring
or encumbering funds or other assets of any nature whatsoever in
which he or any member of his immediate family has a legal or bene-
ficial interest; (6) to provide OTS with 48 hours notice prior to trans-
ferring any asset in excess of $5,000 ....
Parker v. Ryan, No. 90-W186-B-O at 2-3 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 2, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Courts file).
160. Id. at 3. It is not clear whether the order requiring "security" is the same
as the "escrow cease-and-desist order" used in the Spiegel case. Any difference,
however, between an order requiring the posting of "security" and one which re-
quires funds to be placed in an interest bearing escrow account is probably irrele-
vant for the due process analysis.
161. Parker, No. 90-W186-B-0 at 5 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 8, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Courts file). Another issue, which is not addressed by this comment, was
whether issuance of the order exceeded OTS's statutory authority. Id. The court
found that OTS did not exceed its authority. Id.
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Because of the lack of case law dealing with the constitu-
tional limits on FIRREA's temporary C. & D. provisions, due
process requirements are addressed in light of procedural due
process requirements found in post-deprivation hearing cases
outside of the financial institution setting. Due process is ana-
lyzed vis-a-vis the analogous situations of financial institution
conservator/receiver appointments and officer/director sus-
pensions. The situations are similar because conserva-
tor/receiver appointments and officer/director suspensions,
like temporary C. & D. orders, also provide for
post-deprivation hearings and have similar statutory prerequi-
sites.
2. Due Process and Post Deprivation Hearings Outside of the
Financial Institution Setting
In Sniadach v. Family Finance of Bay View, 162 the U.S. Su-
preme Court decided the issue of whether a state garnishment
statute that permitted wages to be frozen prior to a hearing
violates procedural due process.'" In holding that the
prejudgment garnishment did not afford due process,'" the
Court, however, recognized that such "summary procedure
may well meet the requirements of due process in ex-
traordinary situations.""65 In Fuentes v. Shevin,'" the Court
held that a state's prejudgment replevin procedures denied
due process because they did not afford a right to a hearing
before chattels were taken from their possessors.'67 In deter-
mining whether this was such an "extraordinary situation" that
would justify postponement of a hearing until after the depri-
vation, the Court used three criteria: 1) whether the depriva-
tion is directly necessary to secure an important governmental
or public interest; 2) whether there is a special need for the
162. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
163. Id. at 339-40. The Wisconsin statute gave the plaintiff ten days to serve
the summons and complaint on the defendant after service on the garnishee. Id.
at 338. Here, the defendant was served with notice of the garnishment the same
day as the garnishee. Id.
164. I& at 342.
165. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339. The Court cited with approval Fahey v.
Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), which upheld the appointment of a conservator
over a savings and loan association prior to a hearing. Id.
166. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
167. Id. at 96.
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prompt action; and 3) whether there are standards provided by
a narrowly drawn statute." The Court found that the first
criterion was not satisfied because the statute permitted sum-
mary seizure of goods solely for private gain."6 The Court
further found that the second and third criteria were not met
because there was no need for prompt action and the statute
was not narrowly drawn.'7
The Court limited the application of Fuentes in Mitchell v.
W. T. Grant.'71 In Mitchell, the Court upheld a state seques-
tration statute that permitted a creditor holding a lien to se-
cure a writ of execution which permitted the sheriff to take
possession of the debtor's property prior to a hearing.7 Due
process was satisfied because the writ was issuable only by a
judge upon the filing of an affidavit containing more than
mere conclusory statements and because the state statute per-
mitted an immediate hearing after the property was seized.'
This line of cases suggests that there are "extraordinary
situations" where due process may not mandate a hearing
prior to the deprivation. Such situations may exist where there
is a need for prompt government action to serve some broad
public purpose, where there is opportunity for an immediate
judicial review, and where there are procedures to assure that
the deprivation is not completely unwarranted. This comment
next turns to the "process" that has typically been required in
the analogous situations of conservator/receiver appointments
and officer/director suspensions.
3. Conservator/Receiver Appointments
The constitutionality of post-deprivation hearings in finan-
cial institution regulation first arose in the context of conserva-
tor appointments. In Fahey v. Mallonee 71 the Court held that
the appointment of a conservator over a federal savings and
168. Id. at 89.
169. Id. at 92.
170. Id. at 93.
171. Mitchell v. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
172. Id. at 601.
173. Id.
174. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947). In this case, the shareholders of
a savings and loan association challenged the Federal Home Loan Bank
Administration's appointment of a conservator who had immediately taken posses-
sion of the institution without a notice or hearing. Id. at 247.
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loan prior to a hearing did not violate due process re-
quirements. 7 ' One court stated that post-deprivation hear-
ings in this context "fully satisf[y] the requirements of proce-
dural due process " "' and the regulator's ability to close
thrifts immediately "not only is sensible but also constitutional-
ly impeccable."'" Discussing the need for immediate closure,
without a stay for a hearing, that court stated that a stay could
"result in a run on the association that would impair or de-
stroy the ability.., to protect association assets in the interest
of creditors and claimants pending liquidation of an insolvent
association."7 ' Furthermore, taxpayers have a strong interest
in the immediate government takeovers of failing thrifts be-
cause of the fact that most institutions' liabilities are federally
insured, which means that the taxpayers will ultimately have to
bear the cost of asset dissipation.'
In addition to the conservatorship/receivership context,
due process limits of temporary C. & D. orders are also con-
trasted with the authority to suspend financial institution offi-
cers and directors.
4. Officer/Director Suspensions
Once the regulators find that one of several statutory con-
ditions is met, they may issue a notice of intention to remove
an officer or director." Contemporaneous with the notice
being given, the regulators may suspend the officer/director if
the agency determines that such action is necessary for the
protection of the depository institution or the interests of the
depositors.' There is no opportunity for a hearing prior to
175. Id. at 257. In discussing the procedures that provide for a hearing after
the conservator takes possession, the Court stated that "[t]his is a drastic proce-
dure. But the delicate nature of the institution and the impossibility of preserving
credit during an investigation has made it an almost invariable custom to apply
supervisory authority in this summary manner." Id. at 253.
176. Fidelity Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 689 F.2d
803, 811 (9th Cir. 1982), ceri. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Interview with William K. Black, Sr. Deputy Chief Counsel, OTS (March
11, 1992).
180. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(e) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 65.
181. Id. § 1818(e)(3). An officer or director may be removed or prohibited
from further participation in the conduct of the affairs of the financial institution.
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suspension.182 Unless the officer/director is charged with a
felony, he/she may apply to a federal district court for a stay
of suspension or removal. "
In FDIC v. Mallen,' the U.S. Supreme Court faced the
issue of whether the FDIC may suspend a bank officer without
a prior hearing.8" The Court found that post-suspension pro-
cedures" did afford due process, even where a full ninety
days were required to hear the case. 87 In so holding, the
Court applied a three-part test to determine whether this was
such an extraordinary situation so as to justify postponement
of a hearing until after the deprivation. The three part test
examined whether 1) the case demanded prompt action," 2)
there existed an important government interest," and 3)
there were substantial assurances that the deprivation was not
baseless or unwarranted." This test is important because
182. Id. § 1818(e)(3)(B)(i).
183. Id. § 1818(0. If the officer/director is charged with a felony, a suspen-
sion or prohibition order shall remain in effect until the indictment or complaint
is finally disposed of. Id. § 1818(g). However, the officer/director may appear
before the agency to contest the suspension or prohibition, a process that may
take up to ninety days. Id. § 1818 (g)(3). For example, Michael Cousin, former
chairman of Cross County Federal Savings Bank, was suspended two days after a
federal grand jury indicted him on charges that he attempted to bribe an agent of
the Internal Revenue Service to terminate an investigation into a company partially
owned by Cousin. OTS Director Affirms Suspension for Indicted Thrift Executive, 57
BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 4, at 159 (July 22, 1991). Cousin's appeal before the
agency to contest the suspension failed. Id.
184. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988).
185. Id.
186.-See 12 U.S.C. 1818 (g)(3) (1988).
187. Mallen, 486 U.S. at 243.
188. This test was satisfied in Mallen by a congressional finding of a need for
prompt suspension of the officer. Id. at 240-41. The Court deferred to the legisla-
tive finding of a need for prompt action stating that the "legislation under scru-
tiny is premised on the congressional finding that prompt suspension of indicted
bank officers may be necessary to protect the interests of depositors and to main-
tain public confidence in our banking institutions." Id.
189. This test was also satisfied in Mallen because suspension was necessary to
maintain integrity of the banking system and to protect the interests of the depos-
itors. Id. at 241. In another case, preserving the integrity of horse racing was also
found to be a sufficiently important interest to justify suspending a horse trainer
without a hearing. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1969). Permitting a key
officer to retain his position, after public disclosure of a criminal investigation
into the officer's misconduct, could cast doubt on the safety of deposited funds.
A risk is created in that the public could lose confidence in the institution, possi-
bly causing a "run." The government, therefore, has a very important interest in
suspending the officer/director.
190. This final prong of the test was also satisfied in Mallen, 486 U.S. at 241.
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courts appear likely to apply it in assessing the constitutionality
of the temporary C. & D. order. 9'
5. Judicial Review of the Temporaiy C. & D. Order
Also relevant to the due process analysis is the fact that
judicial review of temporary C. & D. orders is available imme-
diately after service of the order.'" The institution- affiliated
party may immediately apply to the district court for an injunc-
tion setting aside, limiting, or suspending the enforcement
pending completion of the administrative proceeding.'" Al-
though review by the district court can be quite costly and
time consuming," the availability of immediate review de-
creases the chances of an unwarranted deprivation."
a. Scope of Review
"Scope" of review refers to the evidence a reviewing court
will examine in scrutinizing an agency decision.'" Congress
did not specify the proper "scope" of review in judicial chal-
lenges to temporary C. & D. orders. In such situations courts
have traditionally limited their factual inquiry to the "adminis-
trative record,""' as opposed to examining "external" evi-
dence, such as testimony and deposition evidence.' This
very limited scope of review is particularly appropriate in this
setting because of the procedural posture of the temporary C.
& D. challenge. Temporary C. & D. orders are typically chal-
lenged by bringing an injunction action against the regulators
The Mallen Court reasoned that a return of the indictment indicated that an inde-
pendent body had found that there was probable cause to believe that the bank
officer had committed a crime and the deprivation (suspension) was therefore not
arbitrary or baseless. Id. at 244. This prong of the test has also been satisfied by
an ex pane finding of probable cause that a felony had been committed. See Barry
v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1969).
191. See infra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
192. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(2) (1988). See text of this section supra note 87.
193. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(2) (1988).
194. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
195. See generally FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242-43 (1988).
196. Franklin Say. Ass'n v. OTS, 934 F.2d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 1991).
197. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park V. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420
(1971) (review of the Secretary of Transportation funding decision was reviewed
on the basis of the administrative record).




and reviewing courts generally do not adjudicate the merits of
the case at this early stage. Further, limited scope has been
found appropriate because of the broad degree of discretion
that Congress has granted to the regulators and because of the
need for prompt regulatory action.'
This limited scope becomes important in mounting a con-
stitutional challenge. If scope of review is very narrow, the
challenger is essentially limited to the facts which the agency
has included in the administrative record. The challenger can-
not introduce other inculpatory evidence to contradict that
which is found in the administrative record.
b. Standard of Review
By contrast, "standard" of review refers to how the court
will examine the evidence,' that is, what degree of defer-
ence to afford the agency's interpretation of the facts. Again,
Congress did not specify the proper standard of review in the
temporary C. & D. context.
Generally, courts review administrative agencies' factual
findings using a very deferential "arbitrary and capricious"
standard."' The United States Supreme Court attempted to
clarify this standard by stating: "[T]he court must consider
whether the decision was based on a consideration of the rele-
vant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judg-
ment. Although the inquiry into the facts is to be searching
and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow
one."' Accordingly, this low "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard of review has been applied in financial institution reg-
ulation cases such as conservator and receiver challenges.'
199. See id. "The close supervision, broad discretion, and quick response di-
rected by FIRREA dictates a narrow and limited scope of review that gives defer-
ence to the [regulator's] judgment, knowledge, and expertise." id.
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971).
202. Id.
203. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard was applied in Franklin, 934 F.2d
at 1142; Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400, (5th Cir. 1987),
ceut. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988) (upheld conservator and receiver appointments
against due process challenges); lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp.
901 (D.D.C. 1990) (upheld conservator and receiver appointments against due pro-
cess challenges). See also Bank St. Croix v. FDIC, 755 F. Supp. 455, 458 (D.D.C.
1991) (FDIC did not abuse its discretion in issuing a temporary cease-and-desist
1992]
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For example, in Woods,' after recognizing that Congress
granted the regulatory agency the strongest powers constitu-
tionally possible in order to preserve depositor confidence, the
court applied an "arbitrary and capricious standard."25 An-
other court stated that "[a]pplication of arbitrary and capri
cious review is particularly appropriate where the central issue
is whether statutory grounds existed for the appointment of a
conservator or receiver."' Simply stated, since the regulators
are the experts in these matters, it may make sense for the
court to defer to the regulator's finding of fact and determina-
tion that enforcement was necessary to preserve depositor
assets.2°7
Although this standard is deferential, "it does not allow
the agency to game the record, act illogically or simply turn
assertions into facts."' The significance of this very low stan-
dard of review lies in the fact that it will be very difficult to
mount a successful challenge to a temporary C. & D. order
because the reviewing court will take the regulators' assertions
as fact, so long as there has not been a clear error of judg-
ment.
F. Use of the Temporary Cease-and-Desist Order Against Spiegel
Spiegel v. Ryan' is the most recent Appellate Court deci-
sion interpreting the temporary C. & D. section, as it has been
expanded by FIRREA. In Spiegel, the government accused
order enjoining operations of a bank branch where the bank's application to open
the branch office had been denied).
204. Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1987),
cet. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988) (upholding appointment of a receiver against a
due process challenge).
205. Id. at 1411-12.
206. Lincoln Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 905 (D.D.C.
1990).
207. Abercrombie v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 641 F. Supp.
598, 602 (S.D. Ind. 1986) ("It is the function of the agency-rather than this
Court--to apply its expertise to determine which sanctions best carry out the poli-
cy of the statute."); Mid Am. Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 523 F. Supp.
568, 576 (1980) ("because of the [regulator's] great expertise and experience in
regulating banking practices, its interpretation of the statutes involved in this mat-
ter is entitled to great weight").
208. Interview with William K. Black, Sr. Deputy Chief Counsel, OTS (March
11, 1992).
209. 946 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Spiegel, former head of Columbia Savings and Loan (hereinaf-
ter Columbia) of numerous improprieties while he was a direc-
tor of Columbia."l From 1985 to 1989 Spiegel was Chairman
of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and controlling share-
holder of Columbia."' Spiegel was accused of engaging in un-
safe and unsound practices and breaches of fiduciary duty
which resulted in losses to Columbia!" and personal gain to
Spiegel."' The government ordered Thomas Spiegel to de-
posit $18,984,000 into escrow prior to an administrative hear-ing."' The goal of the order was to prevent further dissipa-
tion of assets and to prevent further injury to Columbia and
the taxpayers.1 The district court issued an injunction en-
joining enforcement of the temporary C. & D. order," and
found that the order was unconstitutional. 7 The Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that Spiegel was not denied due process
and the order was therefore constitutional.1 The question
thus arises whether Spiegel was correctly decided, and, if so,
whether there are any due process limitations on such use of
temporary C. & D. orders. The remainder of this comment will
analyze this question.
III. ANALYSIS
This section examines whether the Spiegel court was cor-
rect in holding that utilization of the temporary C. & D. order,
as expanded by FIRREA, affords procedural due process. First,
210. Appellants' Opening Brief on Appeal at 5, Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435
(9th Cir. Nov. 2, 1990) (No. 90-55942).
211. Id. at 2.
212. Id. Columbia's reported insolvency exceeded $215 million as of March 31,
1990. Id. at 4.
213. Id. at 2. Examples of Spiegel's alleged improprieties include spending
$500,000 for personal expenses (including $7,840 for a Michael Jackson concert,
$5,290 for cashmere throws and $55,000 for guns and accessories), all at the ex-
pense of Columbia. Appellants' Brief at 5, Spiegel (No. 90-55942).
214. Id. at 2.
215. Id. at 7.
216. Id. at 4. The district court also issued the injunction on the grounds that
the temporary cease-and-desist order was not statutorily authorized by FIRREA. Id.
at 11. This aspect of the case was reversed as well. Spiegel, 946 F.2d at 1438. Sub-
sequent to the district court's decision, FIRREA was amended to overrule the
district court's statutory construction. See 12 U.S.C.A § 1818(c)(1) (West 1989 &
Supp. 1991).
217. Id. at 34.
218. Spiegel, 946 F.2d at 1442.
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the "process" provided in the temporary C. & D. order situa-
tion is contrasted with analogous post-deprivation situations
where the courts have more fully discussed due process re-
quirements. Two situations are conservator/receiver appoint-
ments and officer/director suspension. Second, the "escrow
temporary C. & D. order" applied in the Spiegel case is dis-
cussed and the Ninth Circuit's opinion is analyzed. Due pro-
cess is measured against the Mallen and Fuentes tests.
A. Analogous Situations
1. Conservatorship/Receivership Comparison
Courts have consistently upheld conservatorships and
receiverships against due process attacks."l' The "process"
provided in the conservator/receiver context is quite similar to
that provided in the temporary C. & D. context. In a conserva-
tor/receiver situation, the regulatory agency appoints the con-
servator/receiver at its discretion,' after meeting certain
statutory grounds which are similar to those in the temporary
C. & D. order provisions." There is no opportunity for a
hearing prior to the appointment."
The deprivation in a receivership is quite severe. The reg-
ulator takes physical control of all assets of the financial institu-
tion and assumes all the powers of the officers and direc-
tors."' The receiver can then proceed immediately to liqui-
date the institution."' The deprivation is permanent in that
the conservator or receiver may only be removed by bringing
219. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text. See also Woods v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959
(1988) (the court upheld appointment of a receiver against procedural due process
challenges).
220. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (1988); Id. § 1821(c)(6)(A),(B) (West 1989 &
Supp. 1991).
221. Id. § 1464(d)(6)(A). A conservator or receiver may be appointed when any
of the following conditions are met: insolvency, substantial dissipation of assets or
earnings due to any violation of law or regulation, unsafe or unsound condition to
transact business, or willful violation of cease-and-desist order. Id. Similarly, a tem-
porary cease-and-desist order may be issued where the government finds an unsafe
or unsound practice that is likely to cause signif cant dissipation of assets or earn-
ings. Id. § 1818(c)(1).
222. Id. § 1464(d)(6)(A).
223. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A) (1988).
224. Id. § 1821(cX9)(B).
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suit in a district court for a trial on the meritsY No court
can issue an order enjoining the conservator or receiver prior
to actual removal of the conservator or receiver.n
Compared to the temporary C. & D. order, the depriva-
tion in the receivership is much more drastic. In a receiver-
ship, the shareholders are deprived of all assets of the institu-
tion, whereas in a temporary C. & D. order the shareholder
may only be required to deposit some funds into an interest
bearing escrow account.22' Further, in the temporary C. & D.
order, judicial review is available immediately to enjoin the
order. This provision for immediate judicial review greatly
reduces the likelihood of a mistaken, or unwarranted, depriva-
tion.' For example, in the Spiegel case, the temporary C. &
D. order requiring Spiegel to deposit funds into escrow, was
enjoined by a district court before it ever became effective.2
By contrast, there is an express statutory provision that prohib-
its courts from enjoining the actions of a receiver or conserva-
tor .
The government interest in instituting a pre-hearing con-
servator/receiver action as opposed to a temporary C. & D.
order must also be compared. It appears that there may be a
stronger government interest in appointing a conserva-
tor/receiver without providing a hearing because any
pre-action announcement of the action may spark a "run" on
the institution.2' Further, the value of the institution is apt to
decline if a conservator/receiver action is delayed for a hear-
ing, ultimately at a cost to the taxpayers. "2  Delaying a C. &
D. order until a hearing is provided may not be as likely to
cause a "run" or decline in value of the institution.
225. Id. § 1821(c)(7).
226. Id. § 18210).
227. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Ryan, No. CV 90-3520 SVW at 2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3,
1990) (LEXIS 14968, Genfed library, Dist file), rev'd, 946 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir.
1991). (Spiegel was required to establish such an escrow account).
228. See generally FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242-43 (1988)
229. SpiegA No. CV 90-3520 SVW at 5.
230. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1988).
231. See supra note 27; Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253 (1947); Fidelity
Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 689 F.2d 803, 811 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983) (The court stated that delaying ap-
pointment of a conservator until a hearing may cause a run on the institution.).
232. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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By way of example, in Lincoln Savings and Loan Association
v. Wall, 3' a conservator, and subsequently a receiver, were
appointed for Lincoln Savings and Loan Association (hereinaf-
ter Lincoln) after the regulators concluded that Lincoln was in
an unsafe and unsound condition and that there had been a
substantial dissipation of assets due to violation of the law.'"
In this post-deprivation action,"'5 the plaintiffs were deprived
of their entire $51 million investment (via the conservator and
receiver appointments)."6  They did not receive a
pre-deprivation hearing and they had no opportunity to enjoin
appointment of the receiver." 7 The ultimate trial on the mer-
its,'" did not conclude until sixteen months after the depriva-
tion."9
The plaintiffs in Lincoln surely received less "process" than
in the situation in which a temporary C. & D. order requires a
stockholder to deposit money into escrow. Therefore, the tem-
porary C. & D. order provisions authorizing the regulators to
require restitution should likewise survive constitutional chal-
lenge.
2. Officer/Director Suspension
Another analogous situation is in the area of offi-
cer/director suspensions, which have also been upheld against
due process attacks.24° Again, the "process" provided in the
officer/director suspension situation is quite similar to that
provided in the temporary C. & D. order provisions; after the
regulatory agency finds that one of the statutory conditions is
met, it may issue a notice of intention to remove the offi-
233. 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990).
234. Id. at 902. This was a pre-FIRREA case with conservator and receiver
authority founded upon 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (1988). 743 F.Supp. at 902.
235. Id. at 903. The court recognized that the shareholders did not have a
right to prior notice of the regulator's intent to appoint a conservator and receiv-
er nor did they have a right to a pre-deprivation hearing. Id.
236. Id. at 905. The extent of the plaintiffs' deprivation is questionable due to
the fact that Lincoln was insolvent when it was taken over. That is to say, the
plaintiffs deprivation may have consisted merely of losing a worthless investment.
237. Id. at 903.
238. Lincoln, 743 F. Supp. at 901.
239. Id. at 902 (the conservator was appointed on April 14, 1989, and the dis-
trict court's opinion was filed August 22, 1990).
240. See, e.g., FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988).
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cer/director, and suspend the officer/director without provid-
ing a hearing. 4'
The government interest in removing an officer/director
and in obtaining a temporary C. & D. order merits compari-
son. There may be a stronger government interest in removing
an officer because leaving the suspect in office while a hearing
is being conducted into the officer/director's alleged illegal
activities may decrease public confidence in the safety of de-
posits and may cause a "run" on the institution. Compared to
a temporary C. & D. order aimed against an officer/director
who is no longer associated with the institution, there are few-
er public confidence concerns and, consequently, a lesser gov-
ernment interest in delaying a hearing until after the depriva-
tion.
Compared with the temporary C. & D. order provisions,
the process provided in the officer/director suspensions is less
generous. Unlike a temporary C. & D. order, the suspended
officer, when he is charged with a felony (which is quite often
the case), can not obtain an immediate stay or injunction. 4 '
Further, being deprived of one's livelihood may be a greater
deprivation than having to deposit funds into an interest bear-
ing escrow account. Since the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that the officer/director suspension authority is constitution-
al, 4' the temporary C. & D. order authority should likewise
be held constitutional.
B., The Spiegel Case
1. The Court's Analysis
The district court in Spiegel stated that it applied the
Mallen test. The court found that the third Mallen require-
ment, that the deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted, 44
241. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (1989) (see summary of text supra note 66); see also
supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
242. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (1989).
243. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988).
244. Id. at 240. The third requirement of Mallen is a substantial assurance that
the deprivation (i.e., the temporary C. & D. order requiring Spiegel to deposit
funds into escrow) is not baseless or unwarranted. Id. The court noted that in the
Mallen case the U.S. Supreme Court did not expressly consider whether the depri-
vation itself was warranted, rather the Court inquired as to whether there was sub-
stantial assurances that the elements of the statute were satisfied. Spiegel, No. CV
1992] FIRREA 947
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was not satisfied and that the order therefore violated due pro-
cess guarantees. 43 The court accordingly enjoined enforce-
ment of the temporary C. & D. order.46
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
temporary order used against Spiegel did not violate the due
process clause.247 The court relied on both the Fuentes24 and
the Mallen2 49 cases in reaching its conclusion.2 ' The remain-
der of this comment discusses the court's use of these tests,
identifies questions left unanswered by the Spiegel court, and
suggests answers to these questions.
Under the first Fuentes requirement, the order must serve
an important government interest.25' The Ninth Circuit did
not hesitate in agreeing with the district court that this require-
ment was met;252 identified by Congress "as fighting insider
abuse of savings institutions in order to maintain the integrity
of savings and loan institutions, as well as to protect the public
fisc, which, because of deposit insurance, is obligated to make
90-3520 SVW at 18. In Mallen, once the Court concluded that the statute was sat-
isfied, the Court also concluded without further inquiry that there was "substantial
assurance" that the deprivation was not baseless. Id. at 19. The Spiegel court, how-
ever, refused to take such an axiomatic approach. Recognizing that in the Mallen
case it was not possible to separate analysis of the statute from analysis of the
deprivation, the Spiegel court stated that the Mallen Court must have in fact exam-
ined the deprivation itself, even though it discussed the issue in terms of satisfy-
ing the statute that provided for the deprivation. Id. Therefore, the Spiegel court
reasoned, it must also inquire as to whether the deprivation was warranted, not
merely whether the statute was satisfied. Id. A contrary reading of the Mallen case
would allow "Congress to establish the parameters of due process . . . [which]
violates the well established principle of separation of powers." Id. at 19-20 (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). In making an independent
determination of whether there was substantial assurance that the deprivation was
warranted, the court summarily concluded that "there is no assurance that the
deprivation in question is warranted." Spiegel, No. CV 90-3520 SVW at 20. Accord-
ingly, the C. & D. order against Spiegel was found unconstitutional and enforce-
ment of the order was enjoined. Id. at 21.
245. Id. at 20. The Parker court applied the Mallen test and came to the oppo-
site conclusion than the Spiegel court, i.e., that the order was constitutional. Parker
v. Ryan, No. 90-W186-B- 0 at 11 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 2, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Courts file).
246. Id. at 21.
247. Spiegel v. Ryan, 966 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1991).
248. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
250. Spiegel, 966 F.2d at 1439.
251. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 89 (1972).
252. Id.
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good on most of the deposits in those institutions."2  The
very act of providing a hearing prior to issuing the C. & D.
order could cause insiders to dissipate assets while the hearing
is being conducted.2
Further, the government's interest is strengthened by the
fact that thrift industry is in a state of crisis, a crisis possibly
caused by the very fraud and abuse which the temporary C. &
D. order was designed to prevent.255 The government's inter-
est is further bolstered by the fact that thrifts were enjoying in-
creased investment power2 1 which increased the opportuni-
ties for insider abuse and increased the need for closer regula-
tory oversight. 5" The "moral hazard" risk 2" and risk of bank
"runs" further adds to the government's interest.' Under
these circumstances, the government interest in using an en-
forcement mechanism that does not provide for a
pre-deprivation hearing must be greater than in any other
procedural due process context.W
The court also found that the second Fuentes prong,
whether there is a special need for prompt government action,
was met.2 6' The court found this requirement was satisfied in
253. I& (citing H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 307, reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 432).
254. See Huber, supra note 65, at 134.
255. See supra notes 90-125 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
260. The important government interest was also recognized in Parker v. Ryan,
No. 90-W186-B-O (N.D. Miss. Jan. 2, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
The Parker court recognized the strong government interest in immediately obtain-
ing the temporary cease-and-desist order, without a potentially lengthy hearing by
stating that "due to the urgency of OTS' actions, Parker is not entitled to a
pre-deprivation hearing." Id. (emphasis added). Discussing the Mallen test and the
strong government interest, the Parker court stated that "congressional findings
governing the present case clearly demonstrate that federal banking authorities
may act promptly to protect depositor's interest with [a] temporary cease-and-desist
order." Id. After applying the Mallen test, the Parker court upheld the
cease-and-desist order against due process challenges. Id. at *11-12. The Parker
court did not discuss the other Mallen factors, rather the court found the strong
government interest and the fact that a post- deprivation hearing was provided,
were sufficient in themselves to uphold the C. & D. order. Id.
261. Spiegel, 946 F.2d at 1440. OTS's examiners had found that Spiegel caused
Columbia to lend money to a friend without adequate collateral, which resulted in
a loss to Columbia of $5 million; Spiegel caused Columbia to purchase four con-
dominiums, a jet airplane and a collection of guns. Id. The court also noted that
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two respects. Fist, the court again deferred to Congresses "ac-
knowledgment" of a need for prompt action.6
Second, the court also found support for the "prompt-
ness" requirement by deferring to OTS experts' findings sur-
rounding the specific facts in the case. The court did not, how-
ever, state that a specific factual showing of the need for
prompt action was required to justify the order.2 3 The court
did not question the basis for the finding, and concluded that
it was "not unreasonable" for OTS to issue the temporary or-
der "in order to avoid the risk that he would dissipate his as-
sets or attempt to put them beyond the government's
reach."21
The court also found that the Mallen guideline, which
requires substantial assurances that the deprivation is not base-
less or unwarranted,2 65 was satisfied.2 " The court cited
several factors to support their conclusion that substantial
assurances were provided: the regulator was required to meet
specific statutory requirements prior to issuance of the order;
the decision to issue the order was made by the head of the
regulatory agency, who is an expert in matters such as these;
the expert's decision was supported by detailed factual findings
following a long investigation and the results of the investiga-
tion were submitted to the district court under penalty of per-
jury.67 The court rejected Spiegel's argument that Mallen and
Fuentes required independent verification that the temporary
C. & D. order met statutory requirements in order to satisfy
the substantial assurances test.
21,
Finally, the court concluded that the third Fuentes require-
ment was satisfied,6 9 which requires that the temporary C. &
D. order was issued under standards provided by a narrowly
Spiegel was charged with "accepting inflated compensation and that shortly after
Spiegel stepped-down from running Columbia it was insolvent in the amount of
$215 million. Id. See other charges levied against Spiegel at infra note 213.
262. Spiegel, 946 F.2d at 1440.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240 (1988).
266. Spiege4 946 F.2d at 1440.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1441.
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drawn statuteY. The court supported its conclusion with
Mallen"' and Fahey,2' both of which, the court reasoned, in-
volved statutory standards similar to the temporary C. & D.
statute.7  The court also relied on the type of industry in-
volved and the degree of regulation that has historically existed
in the industry.
2. Unanswered Questions
Two important questions are directly raised by the Ninth
Circuit's opinion: What factual showing must the regulators
make to justify issuance of the temporary C. & D. order? To
what extent should the target of the order be permitted to
challenge the regulators' basis for issuance of the temporary
order prior to the administrative hearing on the merits?
The reviewing courts' limited scope of review coupled
with the low standard of review raises an important due pro-
cess problem. The regulators themselves can ensure the validi-
ty of the order by citing Congress' finding of the need for
prompt action and by alleging conditions which the regulators
believe amount to an unsafe and unsound practice. The re-
mainder of this comment discusses these questions and pro-
poses answers.
a. The Regulator's Requisite Factual Showing
The Spiegel court did not provide much guidance as to the
minimum factual showing that must be made to support the
temporary C. & D. order."5 Most notably, when analyzing the
270. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 89.
271. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, discussed supra notes 184- 89.
272. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), discussed supa notes 174-75.
273. Spiege4 946 F.2d at 1441. In Mallen, the regulators were statutorily autho-
rized to suspend a bank officer if they found "continued service or participation
by the individual may pose a threat to the interests of the bank's depositors or
may threaten to impair pubic confidence in the bank." Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C §
18 18(g)(1)). In Fahey, a conservator could be appointed if the regulators found
that the institution "was 'conducting it's business in an unlawful or unsafe man-
ner,' was 'in an unsound or unsafe condition,' . . . or was 'pursing a course that
is jeopardizing or injurious to the interests of its members, creditors or the pub-
lic.'" Id. (quoting 24 C.F.R. Cum. Supp. § 206.1, as amended, 24 C.F.R. 1943 Supp.
§ 206.1).
274. Id.
275. One reason the Spiegel court did not specify the showing required by the
regulators to obtain the order is because the temporary C. & D. statute itself does
1992]
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second Fuentes requirement (the need for prompt government
action because of the risk of dissipation of assets), the court
did not state that a specific finding of a risk of dissipation was
required.276 Thus, it appears that virtually any finding of a
statutory violation by the regulators, coupled with the congres-
sional finding of the general risk of asset dissipation in the fi-
nancial institution industry, may satisfy the reviewing court
that this requirement is met.
Further, the court did not state what type or what gravity
of banking law violation would justify issuance of the tempo-
rary order. Thus, a question remains as to whether any gravity
of a violation would justify issuance of the order. In Spiegel, the
violations were so egregious that the court did not hesitate to
conclude that the agency was justified in issuing the order.77
But what if the violations are only "minor and technical," or
what if the target of the order has no knowledge of the viola-
tion, or what if the alleged violation resulted from a legitimate
disagreement in interpreting a highly technical banking regula-
tion? These situations involving what may be termed "innocent
violators" would not as readily justify imposing an intrusive
and deprivating temporary C. & D. order that requires the
alleged "violator" to deposit funds into an escrow account pri-
or to a hearing.
To explore this problem further, consider the Franklin75
case. The Franklin Savings Association was ran by Mr. Ernie
Fleischer. Fleischer implemented a complicated risk-controlling
arbitrage (hereinafter RCA) system to guard against, and profit
from, the wild interest fluctuations of the 1980's.9 Franklin
initially profited from the spread between its costs of funds
(short-term liabilities) and its investment returns on its long-
not so specify. To provide guidance to future courts and the regulators' use of a
"prima facie" showing may be appropriate, as used in the Crime Control Act's
prejudgment attachment context. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, 4865 (1990). "A[n] injunction ... shall be granted ...
upon a prima facie showing that money damages, restitution, or civil money pen-
alties, as sought by such agency, is appropriate." Id.
276. Spiegel, 946 F.2d at 1440.
277. See supra notes 213, 261.
278. Franklin Savings Assn. v. OTS, 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991).
279. John W. Milligan, Abuse of Power: How the Government Raihvaded Franklin
Savings, INSTTUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1991, 50, 52-53 [hereinafter Milligan). See su-




term assets.' Eventually, however, this hedging program re-
sulted in huge losses and caused a legitimate dispute between
the thrift, the regulators, and their accountants as to the prop-
er method of accounting for those losses. 8' The regulators
viewed the hedging program as dangerously complex and
risky, ultimately creating a situation that constituted an "unsafe
and unsound practice."' Consequently, because of this "un-
safe and unsound practice" and because of the regulator's
opinion that the accounting rules required posting huge losses,
Franklin was placed into conservatorship.'
Fleischer and his supporters, on the other hand, viewed
the RCA system as a legitimate method of dealing with the in-
terest rate swings that crippled many of thrifts during the
1980's.' Furthermore, Franklin's method of accounting for
the losses from the program was supported by accounting
experts and any difference between Franklin's interpretation of
the accounting rule and the regulators interpretation may be
characterized as a "'fair difference in opinion'"."'
Such a finding of "unsafe and unsound practices" would
also have justified issuance of a temporary C. & D order re-
quiring Fleischer to provide restitution for the losses resulting
from this hedging strategy."86 However, restitution from such
an "innocent violator" would not appear appropriate for sever-
al reasons. First, the hedging strategy was not specifically pro-
hibited by statute or regulation. Second, there were no allega-
tions of illegal or unethical conduct by Fleischer. Further, both
parties presented the opinions of reputable experts in support
280. Milligan, supra note 279, at 53.
281. Milligan, supra note 279, at 53. At the heart of the dispute was Financial
Accounting Standards Board Number 80 [hereinafter FASB 80] which provides the
method to account for gains and losses from hedging strategies. Milligan, supr-a
note 279, at 53. Fleischer and his experts interpreted the rule in such a way that
more of the losses were deferred, thus bolstering Franklin's financial statements.
Milligan, supra note 279, at 54. The regulators and their experts, however, inter-
preted FASB 80 so as to require earlier recognition of a greater amount of losses.
Milligan, supra note 279, at 54.
282. Milligan, supra note 279, at 53.
283. Franklin Say. Ass'n v. OTS, 934 F.2d 1127, 1135 (10th Cir. 1991).
284. Milligan, supra note 279, at 52.
285. Milligan, supra note 279, at 55 (quoting Todd Johnson, FASB project
manager).
286. An "unsound or unsafe practice" is also one of the statutory basis for
issuance of the temporary C. & D. order. See 12 U.S.C. §1818(c)(1).
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of their position. Even a project manager at the FASB recog-
nized that a case could be made in support of either parties
position. 87
Therefore, some limits must be placed on the ability of
the regulators to obtain a temporary C. & D. order which are
not expressly recognized in the Spiegel opinion. "Innocent vio-
lators," who are not accused of misappropriating assets from a
financial institution and who do not present a threat of further
dissipating assets, should not be subjected to the deprivating
temporary C. & D. order. At the very least, these targets
should have some meaningful opportunity to challenge such
an order. ,
b. Mounting a Challenge
Regarding the proper standard of review, judicial review
of agency action has traditionally been very low." According-
ly courts have used an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review and grant deference to the regulator's finding of fact
and determination that the "escrow temporary C. & D. order"
was necessary to preserve depositor assets.289
As to the proper scope of review, the aggrieved party
must be able to challenge, to some meaningful extent, the
regulator's factual basis for the order. However, a balance
must be stricken between the claimant's right to challenge the
order and the fact that this is an injunction proceeding, not a
hearing on the merits. The district courts ability to adjudicate
the merits of the case is further circumscribed by the fact that
such review is statutorily the exclusive domain of the circuit
court of appeals, not the district court.'
IV. PROPOSAL
Temporary C. & D. orders that require the target to de-
posit funds into escrow prior to the opportunity for a hearing
on the merits should generally survive constitutional challeng-
es, as recently held in Spiegel. However, several constraints
287. See Milligan, supra note 279, at 55.
288. See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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must be placed on the regulators use of the temporary C. & D.
order which were not expressly recognized in the Spiegel case.
A. The Regulator's Requisite Factual Showing
When a temporary C. & D. order is challenged in court,
the regulators should be required to demonstrate a
case-specific risk of asset dissipation. Such a risk could be
shown in numerous ways. For example, if the target of the
order is still associated with the institution, or by evidence
indicating the target acquired the assets through fraud. Requir-
ing the regulators to make a specific showing of the risk of
dissipation is consistent with the primary justification for the
temporary order, that is, the temporary order is necessary in
situations where there is a need to preserve depositor assets
from wrongful dissipation while a hearing on the merits can be
conducted." Moreover, such a requirement will prevent "in-
nocent violators," who are not accused of misappropriating
assets and who do not present a threat of dissipation, from be-
ing subjected to the intrusive and deprivating temporary C. &
D. order.' By requiring a finding of risk of dissipation of as-
sets, the temporary C. & D. order will remain primarily avail-
able for cases involving insider abuse, the very types of cases
the temporary C. & D. order was designed for."'
B. Mounting a Challenge
In determining whether the regulatory agency acted within
its discretion in issuing the order the reviewing court should
use an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review and gener-
ally limit its inquiry to the scope of the agency record.'
However, for the limited purpose of challenging the regulators
finding of risk of asset dissipation, the claimant should be
permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence (outside the agency
record).' s In this manner, the hearings essential nature as an
291. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
292. See. e.g., Franklin Say. Assn. v. OTS, 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991), dis-
cussed supra notes 278-85 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
295. In all other respects, judicial inquiry should be limited to the agency re-
cord. For example, the court should not go beyond the agency record in review-
ing the agencies finding of an "unsafe or unsound" condition.
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injunction, not a hearing on the merits, will be maintained,
while at the same time, the target of the order will have a
meaningful opportunity to challenge the order.
V. CONCLUSION
The savings and loan industry was in a state of crisis in the
late 1980's. The crisis was caused, in part, by increased thrift
powers, deregulation, fraud, and insider abuse. In an effort to
bring order to the troubled thrift industry, FIRREA expanded
and enhanced the enforcement tool known as the temporary
C. & D. order. The constitutionality of the temporary C. & D.
order was recently upheld in Spiegel v. Ryan. That case, howev-
er, left several questions unanswered.
This comment first analyzed the preliminary question of
whether the temporary C. & D. order that required the target
to deposit funds into escrow was constitutional. Due process
was measured against two similar enforcement tools,
conservatorships/receiverships and officer/director removals.
This analysis led to the conclusion that such temporary C. &
D. orders are constitutional.
This comment also addressed the questions left unan-
swered by the Spiegel case: What showing must be made by the
regulators to justify imposition of the order? To what extent is
that order challengeable? It was proposed that the regulators
must make a specific factual showing of the immediate need
for the use of the temporary C. & D. order by demonstrating a
risk of dissipation of assets. Further, a reviewing court must
use a very low standard of review in examining the regulators'
action, but, to provide a meaningful opportunity for challenge,
the court must also permit the target of the order to use evi-
dence outside of the agency record to rebut the regulators
showing of risk of asset dissipation. These suggestions are
meant to provide guidance for regulators, courts and
institution-affiliated parties in their dealings with FIRREA's
temporary C. & D. order provisions and in similar situations
where a hearing is not provided until after the deprivation.
Kyle Guse, C.P.A., M.B.A,J.D.
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